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1. Introduction 
Less than a year has passed since the Lisbon Treaty 
became part of EU law, thereby bringing to an end 
almost a decade of intergovernmental wrangling over 
EU institutional reform. Yet despite its protracted 
ratification process and pledges from national 
administrations and EU authorities that the Lisbon 
Treaty had closed the issue of treaty reform for the 
foreseeable future, a number of modifications to the 
EU treaties are currently in the pipeline. One such 
proposal, relating to the number of seats in the 
European Parliament, has already left the drawing 
board and is presently pending national ratification.1 
But perhaps most significant are those proposals that 
could amount to major treaty reform in areas such as 
the Franco-German Declaration of Deauville, which 
proposes significant changes in the area of economic 
and monetary union and, possibly also institutional 
reform. 
This Policy Brief provides an overview of the 
procedures that are available to change the Treaty of 
Lisbon. A companion piece2 looks at the political 
                                                     
1 Protocol amending the Protocol (No. 36) on transitional 
provisions annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (OJ 2010/C 263/01). 
2 See Piotr Maciej. Kaczyński and Peadar ó Broin (2010), 
From Lisbon to Deauville: Practicalities of the Lisbon 
issues raised by the debate on a substantive treaty 
change that is currently underway. 
2. How to amend the EU treaties 
The Lisbon Treaty modified the way in which the EU 
treaties can be amended, with Art. 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) creating a new system for 
treaty reform at EU level prior to an eventual 
intergovernmental conference and national 
ratification. Under this new system, there is now a 
choice between four procedures: 1) the ordinary 
revision procedure, 2) the simplified revision 
procedure, 3) the general passerelle clause and 4) the 
procedure applicable to accession treaties. 
The ordinary revision procedure (ORP) is, as its 
name implies, the standard means of modifying the 
treaties, whereas the simplified revision procedure 
(SRP) can only be used for reforms that do not 
increase3 EU competences and that are limited to Part 
Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (which covers essentially all EU 
internal policies, such as the internal market, 
                                                                                        
Treaty Revisions, CEPS Policy Brief No. 215, CEPS, 
Brussels, October. 
3 Art. 48 TEU seems to allow the use of the simplified 
revision procedure for proposals designed to decrease EU 
competences, as the text specifically refers to the 
prohibition of the simplified revision procedure for 
proposals designed to “increase the competences conferred 
on the Union” (emphasis added). 
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economic and monetary union, the area of freedom, 
security and justice, environment, agriculture and 
competition policies, etc.). 
The general ‘passerelle clause’ allows the European 
Council to a) temporarily or permanently authorise 
the Council to act by a qualified majority in a specific 
case where the treaties provide for it to act by 
unanimity and/or b) turn a special legislative 
procedure into an ordinary legislative procedure (in 
other words, allow for co-decision with the European 
Parliament following a proposal from the 
Commission in a specific area). In both cases, the 
European Council must reach a unanimous 
agreement. Each national parliament has a veto power 
over the use of a general passerelle clause, provided 
that it communicates its opposition within six months 
of notification. 
Accession treaties fall outside the remit of the 
ordinary and simplified revision procedures. Although 
accession treaties alter and supplement the EU 
treaties, all that is required upon the completion of 
negotiations between the EU and the applicant state is 
an intergovernmental conference that drafts the 
accession treaty (Art. 49 TEU). Ratification of that 
treaty is then subject to national constitutional 
procedures. 
3. Proposing treaty change 
In both the ordinary and simplified revision 
procedures, the initial proposal for treaty reform can 
be made by one of three entities: 1) any national 
government, 2) the European Parliament or 3) the 
European Commission. 
In the case of the European Parliament, Rules 41 and 
48 of its internal Rules of Procedure4 apply. Rule 41 
relates to the procedure to be used where a right of 
initiative is conferred on the Parliament by the 
treaties, while Rule 48 concerns own-initiative 
reports. Pursuant to Rule 41, the relevant 
parliamentary committee may decide to draft an own-
initiative report. This report must include a motion for 
a resolution and the draft proposal or decision, 
together with an explanatory statement. 
The European Council is the only institution that may 
propose the use of the general passerelle clause, while 
the accession treaty procedure is activated by 
common accord between the member states and the 
applicant state once membership negotiations have 
been completed. 
 
                                                     
4 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 7th 
Parliamentary term – July 2010. 
4. Ordinary revision procedure 
Overview 
The ordinary revision procedure applies to two broad 
categories of treaty change: 1) ‘prominent’ treaty 
change, where a significant reform of the EU Treaties 
is required; and 2) cases where a smaller reform is 
proposed, but where the simplified revision procedure 
is not available (due to the nature or scope of the 
proposal). 
The distinction between these two categories is both 
politically and legally important. The first category 
may be used in instances where the nature of treaty 
change is considered to warrant a noteworthy reform 
process along the lines of the Convention that drafted 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Convention on the Future of Europe that drew up the 
reforms enacted via the Lisbon Treaty. 
However, it is not necessarily the case that the 
ordinary revision procedure entails a substantial or 
lengthy treaty change process. The second category in 
which the ordinary revision procedure may be used 
concerns cases where the nature of the reform is 
largely technical (e.g. adjusting the number of seats in 
the European Parliament) or, indeed, where the nature 
of the reform is controversial and for political reasons 
member states may prefer not to convene a 
Convention in order to protect against almost certain 
changes that would be made to a treaty reform 
compromise reached among the member states by a 
Convention (e.g. in situations where the reform 
package agreed among the member states is 
considered to be to only political compromise 
available). 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
treaty amendment procedure contained in Art. 48 
TEU has been used once already in the case of the 
ordinary revision procedure. 
Procedure 
Under the ordinary revision procedure, a proposal for 
treaty reform is addressed first to the Council,5 which 
then submits the proposal to the European Council. 
Presumably the Council serves as a type of 
antechamber for initial debate and scrutiny of the 
proposal before passing it over to the European 
Council. At the same time, national parliaments are 
                                                     
5 Art. 48 TEU does not stipulate a particular Council 
formation, but it is likely that the General Affairs Council 
(GAC) will process the treaty change request, as was the 
case for the proposal to amend the Protocol (No. 36) on 
transitional provisions (in this case the Spanish 
Government addressed its proposal for treaty reform to the 
Secretary-General of the Council, who then sent the 
proposal to Coreper; the General Affairs Council dealt with 
the Spanish proposal at its meeting of 7 December 2009).  
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notified of the proposal (presumably by the Council, 
although Art. 48 TEU is not specific on the institution 
responsible for making the notification). National 
parliaments, however, are assigned no formal role 
under the ordinary revision procedure, but in theory 
notification of the proposal allows them to begin 
advance scrutiny of the proposal. 
The European Council, upon receipt of the proposal 
from the Council, consults with the Commission and 
the European Parliament. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) is also consulted if the proposal concerns 
“institutional changes to monetary policy”. The 
European Council may choose to voluntarily consult 
the ECB in the case of reforms that concern fiscal 
policy, although the wording of Art. 48 TEU seems to 
require consultation with the ECB only in the case of 
reform proposals that concern institutional changes to 
monetary policy.  
The European Parliament, when consulted by the 
European Council, refers the proposal to the relevant 
parliamentary committee(s), which drafts a report 
containing a motion for a resolution stating whether 
the European Parliament supports or rejects the 
proposal, plus recommendations for the attention of 
an eventual Convention or the IGC in the case where 
it supports the proposal (Rule 74a(2), Rules of 
Procedure of the European Parliament, under ordinary 
treaty revision). 
Once the consultation stage is complete, the European 
Council takes a vote on the proposal. If it is carried by 
a simple majority, the default rule is that the President 
of the European Council shall convene a Convention. 
The use of a Convention follows the model used for 
drafting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the Constitutional Treaty. The treaties, however, do 
not prescribe the rules of procedure to be followed in 
the event that a Convention is used as part of the 
treaty change process, other than a requirement that a 
Convention be composed of representatives from four 
entities: 1) national parliaments; 2) national 
governments; 3) the European Parliament and 4) the 
Commission. Art. 48 TEU does not set the relative 
weight of these groups in a Convention.  
The President of the European Council is likely to be 
responsible for defining the mandate and nature of a 
Convention, as it falls to the President to convene a 
Convention. In this case the European Council plays a 
key role in establishing the nature and mandate of a 
Convention, as was the case for the 1999-2000 
Convention (mandated by the Cologne European 
Council) and the Convention on the Future of Europe 
(mandated by the Laeken European Council). While 
the two previous Conventions of 1999-2000 and 
2002-03 will undoubtedly set precedents that will 
influence the shape of future Conventions, the 
criticisms levied at the internal organisation of those 
Conventions should equally serve as guidelines.6 
The use of a Convention breaks the monopoly that 
national governments normally hold over treaty 
negotiations, as they must include in treaty talks 
delegations from national parliaments, the European 
Parliament and the Commission. Although the 
member states remain ‘Masters of the Treaties’ in the 
sense that they alone may sign off on the final version 
of treaty reform in an intergovernmental conference, 
their hands will be tied by the version that is 
recommended by a Convention. Any attempt to set 
aside or deviate significantly from the version drafted 
by a Convention would seriously undermine the use 
of such a body as part of the treaty reform process and 
would undoubtedly provoke resistance, but Art. 48 
TEU does not compel the intergovernmental 
conference to accept the recommendations drafted by 
a Convention. 
In cases where the European Council decides that a 
Convention is not required, it must adopt such a 
decision by a simple majority and obtain the consent 
of the European Parliament. Art. 48(3) TEU does not 
provide any criteria for determining when a 
Convention should be used. It simply states that the 
European Council may decide not to convene a 
Convention “should this not be justified by the extent 
of the proposed amendments”. While the initial 
interpretation of this clause falls to the European 
Council, the consent of the European Parliament is 
required to avoid a Convention – a procedural 
requirement that has the potential to be a battleground 
between the two institutions in the case of 
controversial treaty reform proposals. 
If a Convention is convened, it is responsible for 
recommending by consensus a draft treaty text to an 
intergovernmental conference (IGC). If not, the 
European Council defines the IGC’s mandate. 
Once the IGC has agreed the final version of treaty 
reform, the proposal is sent to the member states for 
ratification in accordance with their domestic 
procedures. 
                                                     
6 See for instance criticisms regarding a lack of substantive 
procedural rules and an overbearing governing body 
(praesidium) in J. Jarlebring, “Taking stock of the 
European Convention: What added value does the 
Convention bring to the process of treaty revision?”, 
German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2003,  pp. 785-799. 
 4 | Peadar ó Broin 
Box 1. Ordinary Revision Procedure 
1. Proposal for treaty change can come from any national government, the European Parliament, 
or the European Commission, and may relate to any aspect of the treaties (including proposals 
designed to increase Union competence). 
2. Proposal is addressed to the Council (presumably for early debate on the nature of the proposal), 
which then submits the proposal to the European Council and notifies national parliaments. 
3. European Council must consult the European Parliament and the European Commission. 
4. European Council then votes whether to examine the proposal; a simple majority in favour is 
sufficient to proceed to the next stage. 
5. Two options are available at this point: 
a. President of the European Council is automatically mandated to convene a Convention to 
examine the draft proposal and adopt by consensus a recommendation to a future IGC, but 
b. European Council may vote by a simple majority, after having obtained the consent of 
the European Parliament, not to convene a Convention – in this case the European 
Council defines the mandate of the IGC. 
6. Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is called by the President of the Council (at this stage the 
rotating presidency takes over from the European Council, as the intergovernmental conference is 
the domain of the member states only, not the EU institutions per se). 
7. Ratification at national level begins; proposal enters into force if it is ratified by all member states 
according to their own domestic ratification procedures. 
 
5. Simplified revision procedure  
Overview 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of so-called 
‘flexibility mechanisms’ into the EU Treaties, which 
are essentially provisions that allow for simpler 
methods of decision-making in specific areas of the 
treaties. The simplified revision procedure (SRP) is 
one of such mechanisms, investing the European 
Council with treaty-making powers, but with two 
limitations: any proposal for treaty reform must 1) be 
limited to Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union; and 2) not alter Union 
competences (i.e. national sovereignty that is pooled 
in the Union’s institutional framework). 
Confining the use of the simplified revision procedure 
to Part Three TFEU means that this procedure can 
only be used for substantive changes to EU internal 
policies, but not for institutional reforms, Union 
citizenship, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
Euratom Treaty, provisions relating to EU external 
action or protocols appended to the EU treaties. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court and the 
Czech Constitutional Court expressed reservations 
about the simplified revision procedure, suggesting 
that it may be used in dubious attempts to pass 
controversial amendments when the more onerous 
ordinary revision procedure may be more appropriate. 
Indeed the simplified revision procedure is not 
necessarily confined to de minima modifications; Art. 
48(6) TEU states that the procedure may be used for 
changes to the entire Part Three TFEU, which would 
amount to a major treaty reform. 
Procedure 
A proposal for treaty reform is addressed to the 
European Council, which evaluates whether the 
proposal meets the criteria for use under the 
simplified revision procedure. If so, the European 
Council consults with the Commission and the 
European Parliament (and the European Central Bank 
in the case of institutional changes to monetary 
policy) before it may take a unanimous decision to 
adopt the treaty reform proposal. 
National ratification, however, is not avoided under 
the simplified revision procedure: each member state 
must ratify the European Council’s decision in 
accordance with their domestic requirements. 
In essence, the simplified revision procedure is very 
similar to former Art. 48 TEU prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty reform, with the European Council 
accumulating the roles accorded to the Council and 
the IGC under that article, but with the distinction that 
its remit is limited to changes to Part Three TFEU and 
must not increase Union competences. 
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Box 2. Simplified Revision Procedure 
1. Proposal for treaty change can come from any national government, the European Parliament or the 
European Commission, but the proposal must be limited in two respects: 
a. proposal must be limited to changes to Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (i.e. the part of the Treaty that deals with internal EU policies); and 
b. proposal must not increase the Union’s competence, but Art. 48 is silent as to whether the 
simplified revision procedure could be used to decrease Union competence 
2. Proposal is addressed to the European Council, which adopts the proposal by unanimity after consulting 
the European Parliament and the European Commission (and the European Central Bank if the 
proposal concerns monetary policy) 
3. Ratification at national level begins; proposal enters into force if it is ratified by all member states 
according to their own domestic ratification procedures. 
Policy areas to which the SRP applies (provided Union competences are not increased) 
• Internal market (Arts 26-27) 
• Free movement of goods (Arts 23-37) 
• Agriculture and fisheries (Arts 38-44) 
• Free movement of persons, services and capital (Arts 45-66) 
• Area of freedom, security and justice (Arts 67-89) 
• Transport (Arts 90-100) 
• Common rules of competition, taxation and approximation of laws (Arts 101-118) 
• Economic and monetary policy (Arts 119-144) 
• Employment (Arts 145-150) 
• Social policy (Arts 151-161) 
• European Social Fund (Arts 162-164) 
• Education, vocational training, youth and sport (Arts 165-166) 
• Culture (Art. 167) 
• Public health (Art. 168) 
• Consumer protection (Art. 169) 
• Trans-European networks (Arts 170-172) 
• Industry (Art. 173) 
• Economic, social and territorial cohesion (Arts 174-178) 
• Research and technological development and space (Arts 179-190) 
• Environment (Arts 191-193) 
• Energy (Art. 194) 
• Tourism (Art. 195) 
• Civil protection (Art. 196) 
• Administrative cooperation (Art. 197) 
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6. Conclusion 
Although the Lisbon Treaty will be only one year old 
on 1 December 2010, a number of proposals for treaty 
reform have already been introduced or debated. 
Some of them have been known for some time to be 
necessary, such as the Croatian Accession Treaty, the 
Irish Guarantees7 and the Czech opt-out from the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights. But the ‘Deauville 
Declaration’ on economic governance,8 has now 
added a new element in the form of a Franco-German 
proposal to make a substantive change to the Treaty. 
Some of the processes by which to make such 
proposals part of EU law may be interlinked, yet it 
remains unclear which proposals (if any) will be 
coupled together as part of the same revision process. 
For instance, the Croatian accession treaty could be 
linked to the economic governance treaty change, or 
vice versa. 
 
                                                     
7 Informal name given to the “Decision of the Heads of 
State or Government of the 27 Member States of the EU, 
meeting within the European Council, on the concerns of 
the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon”. This Decision 
was drafted in advance of the second Irish referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty and is designed to protect certain 
sensitive areas of Irish sovereignty (including Ireland’s 
traditional policy of military neutrality and certain socio-
economic rights guaranteed in the Irish Constitution) from 
the application of EU law. 
8 Franco-German Declaration on the margins of the France-
Germany-Russia tripartite meeting at Deauville on 18 
October 2010 (available from the press service of the 
French Presidency at 
http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/Franco-
german_declaration.pdf). 
However, as the Lisbon Treaty created four categories 
of treaty reform, each with their own distinct 
procedures, there is undoubtedly a limit as to what 
proposals can be fused together when distinct 
procedures apply. For instance, would it be legally 
correct to annex non-accession-related reforms (such 
as a proposal to change EU economic governance) to 
the Croatian accession treaty, since Croatian 
accession is governed by Art. 49 TEU and other non-
accession issues are governed by Art. 48 TEU? The 
member states remain the ‘Masters of the Treaties’, 
but they have agreed in the Lisbon Treaty distinct 
amendment procedures that apply to different 
categories of reform. Attempting to ‘piggy back’ 
treaty reform on an Art. 49 TEU accession treaty 
procedure would surely be considered an attempt to 
escape the more onerous provisions of Art. 48 TEU. 
Considerations such as these will weigh on any treaty 
reform proposal and will therefore shape the political 
process associated with treaty change. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of revision procedures under the Treaty of Lisbon 
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